The Destruction of the Islamic State of Being, Its Replacement in the Being of the State: Algeria 1830-47 by Gallois, WRE
 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
If settler colonies are driven by the impulse of destroying to replace, what was destroyed and how 
was it replaced in Algeria? This article shows how an Islamic state of being was replaced by the being 
of the state in the 1830s and the ‘40s; a transformation largely achieved through complementary 
strategies of spectacular and slow violence, ranging from annihilatory massacres to the seizure of 
the productive capacity of peoples and their lands. By listening attentively to indigenous writers such 
as Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed Bey, alongside the banal details of the making of empire found in 
archival documents, a new picture of the development of ‘Algeria’ emerges, along with its 
significance in world history.  
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The Destruction of the Islamic State of Being, 
Its Replacement in the Being of the State: 
ALGERIA 1830-47 
William Gallois1 
 
Bit by bit, try to persuade the Arabs to accept our money.2 
Maréchal Bugeaud 
 
Introduction 
The state, specifically the modern nation state, was not conceived in one place. Nonetheless, if we 
wish to understand how it came into being, the laboratory of the early Algerian colony is a good 
place to look.3 
This essay argues that while one form of state was destroyed in Algeria over the period 
1830-47 – between the Conquest and the push south to the Sahara – it was replaced by a new form 
of life of world historical significance. Indeed, this act of destruction and that which was destroyed 
were also of global importance. The new state was founded on two understandings and praxes of 
violence: first, the spectacular violence of immediacy which was designed to destroy people, 
communities, cultures and livelihoods; second, a programme of ‘slow violence’ designed to capture 
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people and space for all time. The new state retained not simply a Weberian desire to monopolise 
violence within its borders, but was itself forged in and of that violence. While this violence was 
structural, its structuring was programmatic; orchestrated by soldier-politicians who had overseen 
warring in Europe across the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. As Nutt notes, this positive 
emergence of the state in Europe depended on the negative elimination of others in the settler 
colonial world.4 Indeed, the intellectual roots of the state in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Kant 
depend upon this transaction, for, as Kant remarked, ‘The white race possesses all motivating forces 
and talents in itself.’5 
The notion that France ushered in the modern world lies central to History.6 The 
Revolution’s upending of the old order and invention of the modern citizen meshed with the 
Enlightenment’s assertion of man’s control and understanding of the world, presaging Napoleon’s 
military export of these values. Edward Said’s account of Orientalism as the dominant expression of 
interwoven European cultural and political power in the Middle East began with those wars (in 
Egypt), just as Hegel had in his assertion that the end state of political organisation had been 
reached once Napoleon had defeated the Prussians at Jena.7  
Curiously, we pay more attention to these historical failures than we do to the world 
historical success of France in Algeria. Napoleon, after all, was expelled from Egypt, just as he was 
from Prussia. He may have inaugurated the End of History, but he was succeeded by autocrats who 
staved off democratic destiny for many decades. 
What, then, was forged in the French extension of its body politic into North Africa in the 
1830s and ‘40s? In what sense did the making of the modern state depend on the space and time 
which were opened up by the destruction of people and forms of life which encumbered that 
project? Why has that which was destroyed been forgotten? What was lost in its obliteration, and 
what can its memorialists show us about the new forms of life which came into the world in Algeria? 
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This paper begins by considering how contemporary literatures on settler colonialism offer 
novel ways of assessing the Algerian colony, before asking how close readings of indigenous 
historical writers from the nineteenth century complement the critique of writers such as Patrick 
Wolfe, Dirk Moses, Rafael Lemkin and Lorenzo Veracini, as well as looking at their descriptions of the 
social order which was assailed. It then goes on to detail how forms of slow and structural violence 
were implemented across the period 1830-47, drawing on Ann Laura Stoler’s method of reading 
‘along the archival grain’ to show how hitherto neglected colonial letters and reports describe a 
systematic project of state-building through spatially and temporally conceived forms of violence.8  
 
The Algerian settler colony 
‘Settler colonialism destroys to replace’9, Patrick Wolfe remarked, yet we know too little of 
that which was destroyed in Algeria or the relationship between destruction and replacement, while 
the Algerian case scarcely features in the canon of comparative studies of settler colonialism. Wolfe 
goes on to quote Theodor Herzel’s remark that “If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, 
I must demolish before I construct”, and just as the example of Zionism paired such idealistic dreams 
with a practical programme of substitution, the French invasion of Algeria was founded on 
analogous notions of a new house being built atop the ruins of the old. What, though, was 
destroyed? What was replaced? 
Dirk Moses notes that the syncopation of processes in which the ‘elimination of the native’ 
was discussed, countenanced and realized, occurred at precisely the same historical moment in 
Australia, America and Algeria, yet there has been much less historical interest in the eliminatory or 
genocidal qualities of the cultural encounter in Algeria as compared with Anglophone settler 
colonies.10 Like Moses, Patrick Wolfe’s identification of distinct forms of destruction lying at the 
heart of settler colonial praxis also drew on the work of Raphael Lemkin, and his identification of the 
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plurality and interdependence of forms of annihilation when he coined the term ‘genocide’.11 ‘The 
logic of elimination’, Wolfe writes, ‘not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, 
though it includes that’, for it also includes those forms of slow and structural violence which induce 
‘the dissolution of native societies’.12 Such social goals are predicated on the distinctness of settler 
colonies in that ‘settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.’13 
This sense of the structural violence of the Algerian case was famously explored in a 
twentieth-century context by Frantz Fanon14, while Abdelmajid Hannoum’s work extends such 
analysis to the nineteenth century (from 1847 onwards), arguing that the Algerian experience 
reveals that ‘the discourse of modernity itself inflicts and creates the conditions of violence’.15 Unlike 
Hannoum, however, this essay has little interest in the textuality of violence or the means by which 
it was countenanced in cultural production (the chief sources for Hannoum’s project), for, by 184716, 
much of the programme of violent displacement had been accomplished in Algeria. At times it had 
been theorised on the published page, but it is the private records of the fabric of local encounters 
and exchanges between metropolitan and colonial power which reveal the empirical and 
programmatic extent of the destruction of indigenous cultures.17 To a unique degree amongst settler 
colonies, Algeria was settled by soldiers and militarily defined as a polity. 
What the reports, letters and marginalia of the archival record reveal is that Hannoum’s 
description of modernity as being a French export to Algeria18 misses the degree to which modernity 
was made in the colony, or in interchanges between the two places.19 Similarly, modernity did not 
create new forms of violence; rather, novel forms of violence were constitutive of the stitching of 
modernity.20 Murray-Miller’s notion that modernity was instead constructed across the 
Mediterranean rings truer, whilst a great deal of work remains to be done on detailing and unpicking 
the continuities in the politics, ideology and, most importantly, practice of violence in French warring 
at home during the Revolution, abroad in wars such as those fought on the Iberian peninsula, and 
further afield in colonies such as Algeria and Nouvelle Calédonie.21 
 
 
6 
 
Mark Levene’s claim that the massacres of the Vendée in 1790s were not only the 
archetypal modern genocide, but also integral to a new form of nation-building, points to the 
interlocking and productive character of new forms of ideology and violence at this time (alongside 
Schama’s stress on the relationship between violence and new understandings of citizenship).22 
Similarly, David Bell’s contention that the Napoleonic campaigns marked the advent of ‘total war’ 
again established French primacy in the marriage of novel forms of conflict with fundamentally new 
relationships of power between nations and citizens.23 It was in such environments that the 
architects of the Algerian policy were schooled in the creative capacity of modes of violence which 
targeted societies and the environments which supported them; comprehending the political 
efficacy of strangling indigenous forms of life and the dreams which could be built in such spaces. 
 
 ‘A new Peru’ 
Contemporaneous French sources can never be relied on to describe how their Conquest affected 
Algerians24, for while they provided many answers to this question, they did not know what they 
were destroying. They had not been in and of the place. Those who had, such as the indigenous 
writers Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed, Bey of Constantine, are the guides to whom we should turn to 
learn what was obliterated, how it was replaced and what effects it had on local peoples. Listened to 
attentively, we learn that in imposing a new form of governance upon an evolving Algerian space – 
the nation state – colonists destroyed an existing polity and society. In a sense, the historical 
underestimation of the scale of this loss of ways of life has come about precisely because the French 
programme of destruction in Algeria was not as completely annihilatory as, say, the settler colonial 
experience in America or Australia. Algerians remained a numeric majority in their own land 
throughout the colonial period and from the last decades of the nineteenth century onwards they 
were able to reconstitute indigenous societies from subaltern positions. Nonetheless, in the 1830s 
and ‘40s, Khodja and Ahmed Bey were not to know that their people would ultimately live more like 
 
 
7 
 
the black majority of apartheid South Africa than the Cheyenne Native Americans or the Aboriginal 
Australians of Tasmania. 
Indigenous actors well understood that a project of destruction for replacement was being 
enjoined, and that destruction itself was a form of replacement. Having written a seminal text on 
what he saw as the true character of militarized governance in Algeria – entitled The Mirror25 so as 
to suggest the forms of self-deception which underwrote a project of annihilation grounded in the 
idea of goodness – Hamdan Khodja, a leading landowner, merchant and functionary, felt bound to 
respond to French critics who continued to claim that the Conquest was a model of liberal 
imperialism.26 Writing in July 1834, just four years after the arrival of French troops, Khodja 
maintained that after a single month of exploring the idea of working with local elites under 
Governor General Bourmont, the arrival of Clauzel in August 1830 marked the end of any concept of 
shared forms of governance. Instead, Clauzel’s tenure inaugurated the making of ‘a new Peru’, with 
Khodja predicting a future for Algeria in which a lust for booty would combine with the Columbian 
destruction of local ecologies and the introduction of new diseases, resulting in demographic decline 
and the economic capture of indigenous peoples.27 ‘Everyone sought quickly to enrich themselves’, 
he wrote, in a ‘system of extermination and ruination’ (‘une système d’extermination et de 
spoliation’).28 
This systematic quality of extermination and economic destruction was critical because it 
countered the notion that massacres (such as that of the El Ouffia in 1832) and other observable 
instances of atrocities were not aberrant, but formative of a culture of governance. The trope of the 
‘isolated incident’ would often be used by the French in debates at home and amongst Europeans – 
as in the Dahra massacre of 1845 – but Khodja described a radically new form of life emerging in 
Algeria which was built not upon accidents, but upon systems and strategy. These were Wolfe’s 
‘processes’, not simply ‘events’. 
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This stress on the revolutionary qualities of processive violence was also emphasised by 
Ahmed, Bey of Constantine, whose appeals to the French, the British and the Ottomans revealed a 
determination to describe the replacement effects of the intertwining of immediate and structural 
forms of destruction. As he (and 2246 co-signatories, representing the ‘notables of Constantine, the 
heads of the great families, thinkers, teachers and professors, the ‘Ulema and the Bedouin chiefs 
and their notables’) wrote to the British Parliament in 1834, contrasting the British role in the global 
anti-slavery movement with the enslavement of Algerians: 
We write to inform your honourable Parliament that the French entered Algiers after 
signing, aided by your consul’s work as an intermediary, a well-defined treaty. However, the 
French have not respected the terms of this treaty. On the contrary, they have followed a 
quite different path in choosing to expel people from this land without cause, in separating 
husbands from their wives and families whilst seizing their possessions, in subverting 
religion, in taking control of the habous [waqf29] that Muslims established for the poor, in 
taking over mosques in order to live in them or to rent them to traders. Furthermore, they 
have unjustly destroyed houses, killed and massacred without cause, unfairly imprisoned 
others, desecrated graves, and impoverished all the inhabitants of Algiers. As for the 
Bedouins who inhabit neighbouring areas, they were massacred in spite of their having 
made peace with the French and their women and children were killed pitilessly. In the 
history of oppression, we have never comes across such extreme examples of injustice.30 
This catalogue of forms of destruction described the varieties of immediate and slow violence which 
characterised the French occupation from its inception. As the Bey went on to write, ‘it is quite clear 
that their intention is to destroy Islamic law, to spill blood, to change the religion of the place, and to 
avenge themselves against the living as much as the dead [de se venger des vivants comme des 
morts].31 Thus, as Khodja had also underscored, while individual massacres mattered, it was critical 
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to see that the progressive project of destruction was grounded in forms of slow and structural 
violence which sought to annihilate the culture of the living as much as that of the dead. 
The point of origin of almost all writing on the early Algerian colony has tended to be its 
creative capacity and the narrative of its testing coming-into-being32, whereas a study which begins 
with Ahmed Bey or Hamdan Khodja starts from a position of prizing the narrative importance of that 
which was destroyed as much as that was built upon its ruins and ashes. Crucially, Ahmed Bey 
described the interlocking of spectacular, immediate violence with forms of slower, more structural 
assaults on indigenous life: the destruction of houses, the seizure of land and the dismantling of the 
lived culture of justice embodied in waqf institutions. The concept of destroying to replace is most 
plain in his account of the confiscation of mosques in order to rent them to traders, for as a pillar of 
life was removed, it was replaced by a form of economic profiteering and control which underwrote 
the costs of occupation and acted to dismantle the autonomy of indigenous economic actors. And 
given that forms of autonomy were attacked in Algeria, it was unsurprising that much of the fiercest 
resistance the French faced came from those Kabyles whose self-identity was predicated on the 
notion that they were ‘free men’ (Amazigh or Imazighen).33  
That which was destroyed also merits being described as a state, though it was not of course 
drawn along the same lines as the modern European nation state. Instead, the Algerian34 state was 
spatially complex in the sense that it accommodated local power and governance within an 
overarching imperial frame, underwritten by shared religious sensibilities and culture (temporally 
assured by God). Nowhere was this more obvious than in the figure of Ahmed Bey, a kouloughli 
creole, born of a Turkish father and a Maghrebi mother, whose later years were dominated by his 
appeals to Istanbul on behalf of his co-religionists in Constantine, whom he governed and to whom 
he belonged. This state was grounded in the institution of the waqf, with its many practical 
manifestations of enacted justice in forms of social security, public health and other civic goods.35 
This is what the French destroyed, we learn from indigenous writers, and colonists did not replace it 
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with equivalent provision of public services, for the early European nation state assumed few such 
collective responsibilities. Ideas of social citizenship would only become preoccupations in European 
culture later in the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, so their destruction in Algeria 
passed almost without notice for the French, for whom such ways of life were invisible in spite of 
their being quite discernible to local actors. 
While there has been a considerable focus on the confiscation of land by colonists, especially 
after 184736, less is known about the destruction of the productive capacity of indigenous peoples, 
which served as a prelude to such land seizures. Equally, the army’s determination to destroy the 
economic autonomy of local peoples –  through strategies of surveillance and market control – has 
been understated.37 Building on the work of Mahfoud Bennoune, Yves Gallisot, Samir Amin and 
Abdellatif Benachenhou, as precursors to the work of Settler Colonial Studies, this essay stresses the 
role played by the army in building this new world.38 
Bennoune, in particular, argued that the Conquest of Algeria was essentially driven by 
economic motives, including a desire for raw materials and markets for finished goods39, the 
extension of the monopolization of western Mediterranean trade which had already begun before 
1830, along with royalist hostility to the fact that the Regency had made interest-free loans to 
France in the Revolutionary period.40 Critically, adopting a language quite familiar from settler 
colonial studies, Bennoune contended that: 
Besides the military and political ramifications of this conquest, the introduction of 
capitalism, in its colonial form, involved the destruction of the pre-1830 socio-economic 
structures and patterns. This destruction was accompanied by a coercive pauperization and 
proletarianisation of the rural population and the development of a colonial agrarian 
capitalism.41  
 
 
11 
 
As we shall see, this description of ‘colonial agrarian capitalism’ as that which replaced ‘the 
destruction of the pre-1830 socio-economic structures and patterns’ captures only part of the 
radical transformation of the world inflicted upon the peoples of Algeria. 
 
A state of being 
Put most simply, in Algeria a state of being was replaced by the being of the state. Where lives had 
been experienced, they were now subordinated to the needs of the nascent state; a polity, which, as 
Ahmed Bey had observed, sought vengeance against the living as well as the dead. The Bey’s 
inventory of the ways in which the world of indigenous peoples had rapidly changed and been 
diminished described a shift from what he saw as organic forms of life to the hegemony of inorganic 
state control. This authority assumed a power which was not man’s to take, ‘subverting religion’ and 
the order of things. It substituted obedience towards God with submission to the abstraction of the 
state, in which a form of citizenship replaced the gift of life. This new form of political recognition 
was of course alienated for it required Muslims and Jews to renounce their allegiance to their faiths 
if they wished to replace such fealty with the gift of citizenship. Algerians thus became unhumans; 
their collective state of timelessness being replaced by the immanent prerogatives of the futurity of 
the state. Lives of present moral duty were supplanted by obligations to the state and its capacity to 
act beyond morality in the name of an unfolding world. 
This is not to claim that lives before the Conquest had always been benign, nor that political 
power had always acted benevolently, yet a series of critical temporal and spatial shifts changed life 
in the early colony. A stasis of being was predicated on a perpetual present (assured by cosmic 
justice), quite different to the futurity of the temporal hierarchy of the man-made state, in which 
inhuman behaviour in the present could and should be excused by the progressive beneficence of an 
ideal of a better world to come. This should not be mistaken for the Orientalist description of the 
retarded and stagnant character of Muslim societies, for the state of being prized depth and 
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accessing truths through reflective tradition, rather than the reimagination of the world.42 Indeed, 
the Arabic concept of timelessness – khalid – can only really be understood as ‘eternity’ or 
‘immortality’, substituting the sense of lack in ‘timeless’ or ‘intemporel’ with a sense of the temporal 
richness of being.  
If the temporal character of the world became more variegated, spatially life became more 
restricted. Contrary to the beliefs of Europeans, who saw primitive peoples in Algeria as they did 
across the non-West, the old world had been one where life was both local and transnational. While 
the focus of living was grounded in the immediacy of known others, patterns of trade, governance 
and pilgrimage connected the lifeways of people across the Mediterranean and beyond. Critically, 
this space was assured by God, while the life of the nation state was directed by man. This secularity 
of the embryonic state has been curiously underestimated, perhaps because identifying the lacuna 
of religion in French archival sources depends on the recognition of their silences, rather than 
avowed programmes of action. 
That which was destroyed was religious, whether we describe it as a Muslim or an Islamicate 
state. It was underwritten by quite distinct forms of ethics which stood in contradistinction to the 
morals of the new nation state. Where French governance was chiefly driven by the idea of 
beneficence (famously in the mission civilisatrice) and sometimes constrained by the brake of non-
maleficence, in the Islamic state complementary ethics of justice and autonomy sat alongside the 
Hippocratic injunctions to do good and not to do harm.43 As Ahmed Bey wrote: 
What are we to understand of their ambitions for our country, if they pretend that they have 
come here to modernise, to create a culture of justice and to suppress barbarism? Today, we 
reply that we are sure that the barbarism and the injustice which they practice are more 
hateful and detestable than any all the injustice and barbarism that has ever been known 
here.44   
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For the Bey, where France was good and driven by destiny, the Algerian state was just and humble 
before God. Life was directed in the discernment of that which God would view as just, and while 
human life was imperfect, the aspiration to justice was not.  
The individual was also autonomous for her relationship with God was personal, while, 
curiously, the reorientation of the self towards a relationship with the state played out economically 
as much as it did theologically, for the ‘invisible hand’ of both the market and God were replaced in a 
schema of national governance. 
Bennoune was quite right to assert that colonial capitalism was regressive in its primarily 
agrarian character, for the destruction of urban nodes of exchange eliminated both ways of life and 
the capacity of transnational markets to supply the needs of populations across vast spaces. The 
centre assumed control of that which had been decentred, with the imposition of feudalism on a 
Muslim polity in a form reminiscent of the shift that had taken place in the newly European Spain of 
the sixteenth century.45 
 This compression of the space for life was doubly dispiriting for Ahmed Bey since the French 
were aided by the policies of the Ottomans, not only in their general quietism and loyalty to France 
over their own people, but also in the specific policies adopted by ’Ahmed, Pāshā of Tunis, who 
outlawed trade with Algerians, thus ‘obliging them to trade with the infidel’.46 This spatial 
constriction therefore aided the creation of the national market as one of the governing structures 
of the new state, encouraging a questioning of traditional Islamic approaches to the state. 
Hava Lazarus-Hafeh has argued that ‘the traditional Islamic attitude’47  had assumed the 
relatively unquestioning support of believers for political authority. ‘Jurists, administrators, 
philosophers, and authors’, he contended, ‘all presupposed the legitimacy of the state within which 
the Islamic community ran its course and treated it as no more than an administrative 
phenomenon.’  ‘No jurist’, he added, had ‘ever postulated an ideal Islamic state, even in the haziest 
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way, or elaborated an Islamic political theory’. This was the Khaldūnian separation of religious and 
political spheres, especially apparent in the quietism of the Sunni world. 
The revolutionary qualities of the new world which the French brought to and made in 
Algeria, enumerated by writers such as Ahmed Bey and Hamdan Khodja, came precisely in the 
manner in which the new state moved beyond the boundaries of existing ‘as no more than an 
administrative phenomenon’. For the first time, ‘the Islamic community’ was not able to ‘run its 
course’; the flow of life, the natural order of things, was disrupted, and Algerians were forced to 
consider the nature of their governance and rulers afresh. Whereas, in the tradition, as Lazarus-
Hafeh remarks, ‘The ruler was of interest only in terms of his general attitude and moral stance’, 
Algerians were now obliged to confront the idea that ‘the Islamic system’ of living was being 
dismantled by the state, engendering a moral catastrophe of a kind that could not have been 
attributable to any single ruler working within the Islamic system. Instead, as Khodja alleged, a 
‘system of extermination and ruination’ was visited upon Algeria; a notion curiously confirmed by 
men such as Soult and Bugeaud who described their work of extermination as a ‘system’.48  
Atemporal life was replaced by empire’s futurity and its conquest of time. Systematic life 
was grounded in the idea of a world controlled by men, and its contestation encompassed those 
such as Ahmed Bey who wrote of the virtues of the traditional Islamicate way of being and those, 
such as the Amir Abd’ al-Qādir49, who sought to wrest control of the new state from French hands, 
initiating a debate on Islam and its relationship to the state which would course through all Muslim 
lands colonised or invaded by Europeans. From the work of Mohammad Abdu in late nineteenth-
century Egypt, through to the writings of Maududi and others on the subcontinent, right through to 
Wael Hallaq’s50 twenty-first century interrogation of the notion that Islam can coexist with the state, 
the encounter in Algeria inaugurated a new cultural moment which would come to define Islamicate 
and European polities in the modern era. 
This assault on indigenous Algerian modes of lived space and time tallies with the experience 
of other settler colonies at this moment, such as Australia, where the distinct fabric of Aboriginal 
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space-time, in which Dreamings were shared amongst peoples across a network of trade and 
cultural routes, was eliminated in coeval forms of spectacular and slow violence.51 The Dreamtime 
itself, as an overarching and shared temporal order, was thus threatened through the blocking of the 
spatial flow of knowledge in the world. 
As we will see, the French assault on nature and markets in Algeria was motivated by a need 
to diminish the capacity of indigenous peoples to continue to live as autonomous agents. The 
colonist’s frustration with such independent life is replayed over and over again with the 
commonplace description of tribes as being ‘recalcitrant’ across the mass of archival records from 
the period. To take one example, Soult wrote to Bugeaud in February 1843 of the ‘very severe 
punishment’ meted out in the Kabylie, which had included the ‘cruel extreme’ of ‘burning great 
numbers of villages’, as well as ‘destroying at least 20,000 fruit trees’.52  He hoped, nonetheless, 
‘that we will profit from such actions, even with those who have been recalcitrant till now’.53 The 
temporal character of this instrumental assault on indigenous peoples was made plain in his 
concluding remarks that ‘Since such terrible work preserves our own future, let us hope that similar 
forms of devastation will not always need to be inflicted upon those who make our following such 
paths inevitable!’ 
This note also points to a vital corrective in our understanding of the making of the colony 
which emanates from a reading of the archival record. When seen from a European perspective, 
much is made of the piecemeal and gradual manner in which French governance in Algeria evolved, 
following the shifting power relations of soldiers, administrators, merchants and settlers and the 
ways in which their positions were influenced by changes in the domestic polity. Most histories of 
the early colony focus on the persona of Governor General Maréchal Bugeaud – often in dramatic 
opposition to his native foe, the Āmir ‘Abd al’Qādir – yet very few of them look in any detail at the 
extent to which a fully-rationalised military-political strategy was shared by metropolitan and 
colonial power centres.54  
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This strategy was laid out, and developed, in thousands of letters and reports exchanged by 
Bugeaud and other generals with their governmental sponsor, Maréchal Soult, who served as 
Minister of War from 1830-34 and 1840-47, and as Prime Minister from 1832-34 and 1839-47.55 As 
early as 1842, for instance, Bugeaud wrote to Soult that ‘serious warfare has now finished’, and in its 
place ‘the era of reorganization of this vast edifice has arrived’56; this ‘vast edifice’ being the new 
state of which both men dreamed.  Crucially, the huge size of the standing army – more than 
100,000 men in 1840 (by contrast, there were never more than 20,000 British soldiers in the much 
larger settler colonial space of Australia) – gave it ‘unconstrained power’57, and the capacity to 
realise its dreams. As Bugeaud was to write to Soult in July 1842, ‘We are not able to govern the 
Arabs and keep them in obedience through religious force or political sentiment. Force is therefore 
our principal form of government’.58 
The argument of this article therefore draws on this stock of under-researched evidence, 
looking to connect elite policymaking with the mundane practices of empire-making. When, in 1842, 
Soult wrote to General Bugeaud ‘Bit by bit, try to persuade the Arabs to accept our money’, he was 
ordering the enaction of a policy at a very local level, but this was also expressive of a conceptual 
ideal which had been forged in Paris and Algiers. At both levels, it was expressive of the idea of slow 
violence, for the acceptance of French currency by intractable tribes could be recorded as evidence 
of their definitive defeat, whilst more generally it conveyed the idea of social incorporation or 
capture for all time, for once you began to trade in the currency of your enemy, you lay at the mercy 
of their management of your affairs in something which became a national economy. Bugeaud’s 
Marxian insight into the symbolic power of money relations is mirrored across the thousands of 
routine and unremarkable sets of orders and notes which travelled around the nascent colony, in 
which we witness the spread of a cash nexus in which organic modes of exchange were replaced by 
the inorganic dominance of the monetary sign as economy replaced ecology.  
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Slow violence 
The concept of slow violence requires a new analytic optic according to its originator, Rob Nixon.59 
He contrasts the ‘immediacy’ of conventional violence which lies in full view of the critic (and both 
victims and perpetrators), with forms of ‘subterranean’ violence whose effects might be just as 
devastating in spite of their being harder to perceive. Nixon’s argument primarily pertains to forms 
of environmental destruction in the contemporary world, but his concept is arguably of broader 
historical value. 
In the Algerian case, Nixon’s stress on the way in which the consequences of violence are 
mediated upon peoples through the degradation of the ecologies which support their ways of life 
maps precisely onto the French aspiration to conquer through the elimination of traditional ways of 
living. Similarly, Nixon’s idea that forms of slow violence can lie hidden because of their temporality 
(their effects may be postponed to the future) and their spatiality (they may only affect unseen 
others elsewhere) also seems to reflect the insights of environmental histories of nineteenth-century 
empire.60 
Much has been written about spectacular forms of immediate violence in the early Algerian 
colony61, yet almost no attention has been paid to those forms of slow violence which secured 
French control of a land and its people, along with the formation of a new state. In part this is 
because what became the French predominant military strategy – the razzia – combined both 
spectacular and slow forms of violence, often entailing massacring, but also including the colossal 
confiscation of goods and livestock (as many as 1.2 million sheep in a single raid), as well as the 
destruction of habitats and crops.62 
The razzia was judged by the French to be an acceptable form of warfare in Algeria; ‘natural’ 
in the sense that it accorded with the innate violence of the place (being notionally based on the 
Arabic ghāzwa63), its people and their land, and in the manner in which it sought to impose 
European cultural and governmental control upon the harsh environment which sustained such 
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warring peoples. It was also presumed to be effective because it deployed violence in a 
communicative manner which purportedly made sense to the peoples of the Barbary Coast. The 
razzia’s perfection lay in its timelessness in that it echoed historic forms of violence from the 
Maghreb, whilst destroying lives and livelihoods in its present, along with their future capacity for 
life. 
Over time, the economic motive became imperative in such raids, for they combined the 
colonist’s need to establish lines of communication and markets which could sustain the burdens 
imposed by the huge standing army, whilst at the same time degrading the ecological and economic 
capacity of France’s enemies to live independent of imperial control. The amalgamation of such 
goals and strategies was made plain in a typical letter of June 1842 from Bugeaud to a commander in 
the field in which he laid out his goals for the campaigning season.64 The Governor General began by 
setting out which territory the general ought to try to retain, focusing on the strategic town of 
Attlah, for if it was held ‘it would offer security to the Metidja and the surrounds of Algiers, whilst 
opening up a degree of commerce which is so vital for this small town’. The mission’s secondary aim 
was to ‘introduce into Miliana and Médéa as much grain as possible, especially barley’, with troops 
rewarded with the sum of 14 francs for every quintal (100lb) of barley and 20 francs for every quintal 
of wheat they brought to market. Such crops would not only sustain the army, but the control of 
their sale would help to establish an economic dominion, in a market in which prices could be 
reduced through the colonist’s control of the supply of goods. 
The degree to which the slow violence of the razzia was strategised and implemented across 
the colony is apparent in the ordinary records left behind by colonists, such as a report from the 
cercle d’Aumale from 15 July 1847. There, the local functionary, writing to his politico-military 
masters in Algiers, reported that ‘the majority of the inhabitants have been able to pay their portion 
of the Zekkar tax’.65 However, one tribe, the Beni Sala, were proving more obdurate. They had an 
‘undisciplined’ ‘character’ and were not so ‘submissive’. The occupier knew, nonetheless, that by 
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this point power lay in his hands. The tribe were ‘constrained by the fear of seeing their harvests 
destroyed’ (note here the indirect verbal formulation). For this reason, the French knew that they 
would hasten to take their grain to secret mountain redoubts, which they considered to be 
unseizable. ‘The report’, again using forms of language which denied human agency, ‘foresees that, 
in order to stymy their wicked plans, it will be necessary to offer them a severe lesson’ [de leur 
donner un leçon sévère]. 
Here, then, the overarching temporality of the razzia was again made plain: in order to make 
a future which avoided the traps of the past, instructive violence would need to be administered in 
the present. Once this had been undertaken, the cercle d’Aumale would be more like that of Boghar, 
which had reported to the central authorities in the same sequence of reports, remarking that there 
had been ‘a notable increase in trade with the tribes of the south as compared with previous 
years’.66 
One of the distinctive features of the Algerian settler colonial case was the degree to which 
the control of marketplaces lay central to the French project of slow violence. Writing more 
generally, Wolfe notes that: 
Whatever settlers may say— and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for 
elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to 
territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.67 
While this was as true of Algeria as it was of America or Australia, the settler colonial project in 
North Africa was predicated not on land seizures (which would come later), but on the destruction 
of traditional modes of exchange with their replacement by a ‘national’ marketplace for goods, 
established and controlled by the colonist. Territoriality in this context extended beyond the 
terrestrial to include a more encompassing conceptual idea of a space of exchange, in which the 
capacity for the sale and purchase of goods to provide life was managed by the state. 
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This strategy was based upon the stock of ethnographic observations sent by officers to their 
superiors, for, writing about the period before the Conquest, Elbaki Hermassi had observed that the 
marketplace was critical to the life of the peoples of the Maghreb: 
Contrary to the stereotyped image of traditional society, neither the North African tribe nor 
the region could have existed with a closed economy. It was vitally necessary for the 
populations of both the north and the south to make regular visits to places of exchange. 
The Kabylia region, overpopulated and recalcitrant to central control, needed wheat 
products for subsistence; to that end it had to commercialize its oil and figs in the 
marketplaces of the Tell, and it became greatly dependent upon its relationship to this 
market. The tribes of the south also depended upon the market; there, they exchanged their 
wool, livestock and dates for grain and other items purchased in the fertile regions of the 
north. […] The marketplace, strategic as it was for exchange, was also instrumental in 
cementing social relationships for an otherwise dispersed and fragmented population.68 
Mahfoud Bennoune noted the degree to which the French army saw the destruction and 
depopulation of urban centres as being critical to their military-economic goals, for such tactics also 
blunted the trading system of the entire country as urban markets ceased to function as efficient 
centres of exchange. As he noted, the population of Oran fell from 10,000 in 1830 to just 1,000 in 
1832, while that of the capital halved in 1831.69 The same was also true of the third-largest city in 
the region, as a colonial official had remarked in 1845: 
Constantine is horrible to see; all buildings are falling in ruin, and half the houses that were 
there five years ago have been demolished. The indigenous population is in a terrifying state 
of misery and deprivation… by expelling the traders, by taking all sorts of violent measures, 
we have spread misery everywhere.70 
Reports of the success of such destructive policies were abundant across the period 1842-47 
in which the submission of the Algerian as a producer was invariably paired with joyful descriptions 
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of the bounty enjoyed by French soldiers in the deserts or the mountains of the place soldiers called 
‘the land of thirst’ (‘le pays de la soif’).’71  
 
Market control 
Detailed accounts of the functioning of particular marketplaces can also help us to 
understand how the entry of indigenous peoples into national and international markets served to 
diminish both their physical capacity and their ability to exist in the new world of empire: the slow 
forms of oppression which, paired with the immediacy of the razzia, enjoined the demographic 
decline of the middle decades of the nineteenth century.72 They are also revealing of the manner in 
which the state replaced a state of being. 
One such report described the marketplace of the main square of Mascara in June 1842, in 
which: 
The Arabs who come to our markets have been spending a great deal of money in the 
square. At first, they frequented the Moorish cafes, and then they bought a great number of 
cottons, silks, Indian fabrics, handkerchiefs and other materials, before acquiring foodstuffs 
such as sugar, coffee, salt and pepper. In general they went on to export many of the goods 
acquired in the market via merchants from Oran or Mostaganem.73 
The writer went on to approvingly note that ‘in general our markets are very busy’, while in the last 
week it had been remarked that many more Arabs were in attendance than had been the case 
before. The manner in which this economic pacification could quickly morph into a tool of 
destitution was plain in the final section of the file in which it was reported that ‘The Arabs receive a 
great deal of money for the farmyard animals which they hire to merchants who transport goods 
between Oran and Mostaganem’.  
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In fact, the accompanying statistics reveal, the market rate for such services had tumbled 
from 120 francs an animal in January, to 100F in February, a rapid decline to 80F, then 60F, then 40F 
in March, and ‘now we pay only between 25F and 30F’, with some rates falling as low as 20F. Even 
given the economic illiteracy of the age, we might ask how the writer of such a document could not 
understand that such a vertiginous fall in the value of indigenous assets evidently foretold an 
economic crisis. While it may have originally been the case that Arabs received ‘a great deal of 
money’ for such services, the writer does not reflect on how it had come to pass that the value of 
such animals had fallen sixfold in a matter of months. What was evidently key to him was the fact 
that ‘now we pay only between 25F and 30F’, for the alterity of the producer was lost in the joy of 
the consuming self, happy that the military-economic strategy of Soult and Bugeaud had so radically 
transformed the markets of the country in favour of the occupier. 
The collapse in values at the market of Mascara in 1842 was mirrored in the movement of 
prices on a larger scale after the army’s success in capturing the productive capacity of the country 
after 1845. Once the state was able to fix prices in the province of Algiers, the value of a metric 
quintal of wheat fell from 33 francs in 1856 to 22 francs in 1862, and 17.50 francs in 1865, while that 
of barley dropped from 19 francs to 13 francs to 9.50 francs across the same period. Indeed, Kitouni 
observes, this price setting constituted a form of ‘double taxation’, for a transaction charge was also 
applied to such trading, further enhancing the privation of local peoples, whilst from 1845 onwards 
taxes which had formerly been payable in goods were now demanded in monetary form, 
necessitating the sale of agricultural products at artificially low rates in markets and the added 
expense of incurring transport charges as goods were moved to designated trading centres.  
More generally, Kitouni argues that historians have systematically underestimated the 
impact of French taxes (often invented using terminology in Arabic as a means of imputing a sheen 
of legitimacy to them– the ashour, zakat, hokor), fines, ‘les tributs de guerre’ and customs duties, 
and the degree to which they were conceived of as strategies of ruination.74 The French had always 
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operated with an assumption that it was just that the costs of occupation should be shared between 
conqueror and conquered; a source, understandably, of as much resentment as almost any other 
feature of the annexation of Algeria.  
Knowing the value of commodities was a step along the path to being able to control the 
cost of goods, which was a precondition of a form of economic domination in which the 
monopolization of the sources of life was a means of securing Algerian bodies as units of labour (or, 
more accurately, securing as many such units of labour as were needed in the new Algerian 
economy).  This was, therefore, a modern form of war in the sense that local markets and forms of 
barter were irreversibly shifted into a hegemonic economy under the sign of money in which the 
French franc served as a cipher for all forms of value.  
Bugeaud wrote to General Bedeau in May 1842, ‘4,800 piastres left here on the 24 April, 
bound for Tlemcen’, as though he was speaking of the size of a fighting force.75 And, as we have 
seen, local peoples had needed to be encouraged to use French money, in the knowledge that their 
use of such currency in their daily lives would symbolize their complete incorporation into the 
lifeworld of the colonist. As Aristide Gilbert reported from Algiers in 1831, the French systematically 
confiscated the goods and properties of local notables, such that ‘the wretched owners, the majority 
of whom were expropriated without compensation, were reduced to begging […] We imported a 
considerable volume of money into Algeria. It soon took the place of the local currency, which was 
declared not exchangeable.’ 76 This, Bennoune notes, had the effect that ‘Those who were spared 
were eventually ruined by inflation, which was aggravated by the introduction of French currency.’77 
Bugeaud went on to remind Bedeau that he and his men should only pay for transport and 
other services using French money and that they should insist that the local Jews did the same, 
‘under penalty of being chased away.’78 It was imperative, moreover, that the Jews did not use 
Spanish currency and the Governor General recommended that an example be made of some of 
them to drive this message home.  
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France operated in both a moral and an economic sense with an overriding desire for 
completeness, reacting badly when this dream of absolute control was threatened. In a commercial 
sense, this included the dangers posed by the production of counterfeit money – as in the case of 
the discovery of a workshop in Mascara producing fake French and Spanish coins, which were 
‘perfectly’ imitated79 – to their awareness that their control of trade was far less complete than they 
would have wished.  
Nonetheless, the colonist’s lack of awareness of what had been replaced through 
destruction is made plain in this remarkable graph from Élisée Reclus’ Universal Geography of 
1885.80  
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The figure shows the extent of the trade deficit which built up across the period 1830-85, but, far 
more importantly, it reveals that the French truly believed that their arrival marked a Year Zero in 
the history of the Algerian economy. In contradistinction to Hermassi’s picture of local markets being 
connected to international networks of trade, for Reclus, Algeria had only entered the world in 1830; 
France had given Algeria her place in the world. This complete blindness as to the character of 
 
 
26 
 
Algerian society was of course mirrored in Orientalist binaries of a modern, scientific and 
technological European state arriving in a backward and unscientific native culture (given the lie in 
work by scholars such as Clancy-Smith81) and the fantasy of the tabula rasa, in which French generals 
and politicians dreamed that they might be able to inscribe a new world on the blank slate which 
was Algeria. As Moses and many others have observed, it was the idealism of this dream which often 
served as the wellspring of exterminatory ideas in print and in practice. 
 
1847 
Perhaps, then, we should look to 1847, rather than 1848, as marking a decisive moment in world 
history. Rather than focusing on failed European revolutions, we might consider the moment of 
victory of a transformative occupying force in Africa. Only the Sahara remained for France to 
conquer and the decades of frustration for the army, in which they had relentlessly sought to 
measure the population, the productive capacity of the land, the value of foods, prices across 
markets, and so on, were to be replaced by a world in which the costs of goods and services could 
now be fixed on a national level, with three-year plans setting prices for foodstuffs, the transport of 
goods and much else.82 To control prices was to control both production and consumption, to 
command the lives of the peoples of the country, and to impose an absolute sense of order onto 
territories which had been frustratingly chaotic and sufficiently porous that forms of life which 
worked against the interests of the military state could thrive and survive.  
Rey-Goldzeiguer’s work on the 1850s and ’60s described the manner in which many of the 
impoverished peoples of Algeria were left with no options but to migrate to the cities once the 
conquest had been completed, to towns where they would invariably be broken as dispensable cogs 
in the machine of a monopoly capitalism established without the welfarist safeguards which would 
emerge in Europe.83 As Bennoune wrote: 
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Once the capitalist mode of production was introduced into Algeria it subjected all the pre-
existing socio-economic forms to the exigencies of capital accumulation for the benefit of 
the settlers, who, besides land capital, needed a free labour force. However, in order to 
work for the colonizers as share-croppers or wage-laborers, rural producers had to be 
expropriated; and the socio-economic organization of their respective communities had to 
be disintegrated and reorientated.84 
It is important to recognise that this movement of people and labour was far from an accidental 
consequence of empire, but was a strategic imperative for an army whose ‘reorganization’ of the 
‘vast edifice’ of the nation depended on increasing productive capacity whilst reducing the costs of 
production.  
We should not to be surprised that a consequence of this economic hegemony was the 
inability of the ecology, environment and economy to provide for people in times of want. The 
margins of existence, in times of drought or other ‘natural’ disasters, were now controlled in a 
scientific fashion by the state with little interest in replicating the survival mechanisms which had 
been built into traditional ecologies. Silos of grain hidden in the mountains could not be 
countenanced in this new world85, and as Ageron noted, glossed by Davis in his broader account of 
empire and capital’s role in the creation of famines in the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
the value of goods and livestock actually tended to diminish at times when starvation was taking its 
hold on the population. While this may seem counterintuitive, for we would expect the cost of 
subsistence foodstuffs to rise at times when lives were threatened, colonial control of the economy 
had, as we have seen, been based upon the principle that the unit costs of labour and goods 
provided by the Indigènes should be relentlessly pushed down so as to make the colony ‘pay for 
itself’.  
As one report from the province of Oran had it in July 1847, ‘the price of grains had reduced 
by a sensible amount’ – for the consuming Self could never imagine the consequences of such shifts 
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in the market upon producing Others.86 In situations such as the famines of the late 1860s, it 
therefore seems unsurprising to see rapid falls in the price of goats and other subsistence farm 
animals, for Algerians found themselves caught between a colonial economic system in which value 
was determined by low prices (with, as we have seen, rapid falls in value interpreted as being of 
universal benefit) and European traders and markets who were able to relentlessly exploit the need 
of people on the margins of life to sell the only goods they possessed.87 
French soldiers and administrators were in fact convinced that developments, and falls in 
prices, were a sign of an increasing harmony between them and Algerians. Another report of 1847 
noted that ‘tranquillity reigns right across the Province of Algiers’, going on to note that ‘the work of 
harvesting has finished amongst nearly all the tribes, while the markets are becoming better stocked 
with grains […] Transactions between Arabs and Europeans are taking place with a sense of 
confidence in each other.’88 Such accounts were absolutely assured of the benevolence of colonial 
rule and wilfully blind both as to how such a radical shift in markets had come about and how it 
might actually have been interpreted by those who were most affected by the arrival of this new 
world. 
 
Conclusion 
While it was true that the economy of colonial Algeria would be by no means static, in 
particular following the so-called ‘victoire des colons’ from 1870 onwards in which the interests of 
civilian colonists came to gain parity with the concerns of the army, it remains critical to understand 
how the structures of that colonial economy were made in the first decades after the invasion. The 
actions of the French army bear comparison with other European settler colonies, such as America 
and Australia, even if the Algerian example may have been unusual in the sense that programmes of 
killing were directly implemented for economic purposes by the army as a branch of the state, 
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whereas more complex negotiations between a distant metropole and the settlers of the frontier 
pertained in other cases.  In Algeria the army on the ground did not aspire to eliminate all natives in 
the name of building a new economic world in north Africa (reviving the granary of Rome), but the 
logic of its desire to possess Algeria (and its markets) and Algerians (and their productive capacity), 
inevitability led to a substantial indigenous die-out in the country. In such a world, wars were fought 
over food, peace was proven by the entry of indigenous peoples into French markets, and their 
submission was believed to have been attained when Algerians held French coins to be arbiters of 
value in the world.  
This was a project of creative destruction, yet colonial historians have rarely shown much 
interest in that which was replaced in this place. In establishing a centralised state which monitored 
and controlled both production and consumption, the French army destroyed modes of exchange 
which were expressive of powerful ideas of local independence and freedom, as well as the 
interconnectedness of peoples in the Islamicate world. As Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed Bey noted, its 
pillars were torn down by colonists who sought to replace worlds of autonomy and justice with the 
controlling, beneficent, hand of the state.  This was as true in the seizure of mosques and waqf 
income in the earliest days of the Conquest as it was in the slower domination of flows of 
production, trade and consumption.   
In their new world, women and men now interacted with each other in novel ways, for we 
might say that the Hegelian sense of thymos disappeared as Algerians became ghosts in their own 
land. Rather than the modern state conferring universal Platonic dignity, it removed a system of 
godly universal esteem and the lived manifestations of justice which served as the bases of society. 
Plato suggested that the thymotic urge – the desire of humans to look into the eyes of the Other and 
to see respect – drove political change, yet in imperial situations such as Algeria, it was the negation 
of such a culture of respect which was engineered by the colonial state. The aspiration of Algerians 
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therefore became the restoration of that which had been destroyed and its eventual re-enactment 
into a future world re-engineered by the settler colonial project of destruction and replacement. 
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